

# LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY

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Denn dieses scheint die Hauptaufgabe der Biographie zu sein, den Menschen in seinen Zeitverhältnissen darzustellen und zu zeigen, in wiefern ihm das Ganze widerstrebt, in wiefern es ihn begünstigt, wie er sich eine Welt- und Menschenansicht daraus gebildet und wie er sie, wenn er Künstler, Dichter, Schriftsteller ist, wieder nach außen abgespiegelt. Hiezu wird aber ein kaum Erreichbares gefordert, daß nämlich das Individuum sich und sein Jahrhundert kenne, sich, in wiefern es unter allen Umständen dasselbe geblieben, das Jahrhundert, als welches sowohl den Willigen als Unwilligen mit sich fortreißt, bestimmt und bildet, dergestalt, daß man wohl sagen kann, ein jeder, nur zehn Jahre früher oder später geboren, dürfte, was seine eigene Bildung und die Wirkung nach außen betrifft, ein ganz anderer geworden sein.

— Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit (Vorwort)

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
## THE QUARTERLY NEWS LETTER General Topics 10

MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION

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# LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF GENERAL TOPICS 10  
MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION

Leonard F. Manheim, Publisher & Editor

Eleanor B. Manheim, Associate Editor

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Dean Harry A. Grace comments on a persistent psychological pattern in the novels of Pierre Boulle; John Hagopian and Richard Hovey report on doings along the lit-psych front in the Saarland and Maryland, respectively, and your Editors announce the 1961 meeting and point with pride.

"Freud and the Poet's Eye,"  
by Norman N. Holland. . . . . 36

Shakespeare scholars with Freudian predilections have always been torn by conflicting loyalties. Why did Freud, with a strong claim to Shakespeare scholarship in his own right, evidence so much anti-Shakespearean, even anti-literary, prejudice in his writings? Professor Holland has met the problem head-on by applying the principles of psychoanalytic biographical and textual investigation to Freud himself. The reader who cares to do some preliminary homework, over and above the copious references in the notes, would do well to go back to the following: Professor Fraiberg's "Freud's Writings on Art," VI, 4, 116-130 (now the first chapter in Psychoanalysis and American Literary Criticism), Professor Weisinger's "The Hard Vision of Freud," VII, 1, 5-8, and Professor Holland's own "Freud on Shakespeare" in the April 1960 issue of PMLA. We anticipate the completion and publication of Holland's study of Shakespeare and his psychoanalytic critics.

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in Psychoanalytic Ego Psychology,"  
by Louis Fraiberg . . . . . 45

We have published few theoretical studies of psychology in its relation to literature and criticism; the reason: we have received few such papers. In our bibliographies we have referred to such studies in recent psychological journals and books, but rarely would we have considered such papers appropriate for publication in this journal. Their point of view is almost never that of the literary scholar, and there are few literary scholars who possess the competence to write persuasively and with authority in this field. These few include Professor Fraiberg. Here too, however, some preliminary homework is called for: Fraiberg's own "Psychology and the Writer: The Creative Process," V, 4, 72-77 (or, better, the first four chapters of Psychoanalysis and American Literary Criticism), Simon Lesser's "Some Unconscious Elements in the Response to Fiction," III, 4, 2-5, and "Tragedy, Comedy and the Esthetic Experience," VI, 4, 121-139 (or, better, all of Lesser's Fiction and the Unconscious), Frederick Hoffman's contribution to the Freud Centenary Issue (VI, 4, 111-115), and Miss Bodkin's "Literature and the Individual Reader," X, 2, 39-44.

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With this issue the heading "Other Books Received" will be merged with the running Bibliographies. Only books with some appeal to the special interests of our readers will be listed. We shall continue, as before, to list offprints received and items in recent publications and digests.

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#### ANNOUNCEMENT, NOTES, AND COMMENTS

##### \* \* Pierre Boulle and Gordon Allport

Harry A. Grace, Dean of Students and Professor of Psychology at Alameda State College in Hayward, California, in submitting the following note on the novels of Pierre Boulle, comments on the increasing interest in this author, as evidenced by the appearance of his novels in hard-cover and paperback editions in English translation, as well as the adaptation of some of them for motion pictures and television. "I have tried to probe into the reasons for Boulle's popularity," he writes, "because I think he treats a symptom of our age of anxiety — the need for certainty. More exciting to me, however, is the use that Boulle makes throughout his work of the principle of functional autonomy described by Gordon Allport." All of which constitutes an excellent reason for presenting to our readers

##### Pierre Boulle and the Principle of "Functional Autonomy"

As Pierre Boulle introduces his heroes to us, the reader identifies himself as Western man caught in the conflicts of his civilization.

A second point of identification with the hero occurs because the individual is able to avoid guilt. He may be shamed for falling short of the code, but he has no private problems of conscience.

A third point which facilitates identification with the hero grows out of the code's offer of absolute certainty. The hero has no question of his future. His behavior is predictable. In step with tradition, he acts in a lawful manner. He is Platonic man, the Western concept of what an Asian might be.

In each of Boulle's novels, the central character is plunged into a new role. During this immersion, logic and loye act upon him. When the crisis arises, it presents the alternative of choosing structural motives of an earlier self or functional motives of the current self. As the author portrays the decision, functional motives predominate.

Like prisoners most susceptible to brain-washing, Boulle's heroes have developed their personalities in autonomic response to stimulation. <sup>1</sup> As they change masters, new rewards and punishments extinguish their early behavior and they acquire new personalities.

He gradually came to realize that if there was any bloody justice in the world, it was to be found on our side. After repeating this over and over again month after month, he ended up by believing it himself and

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1/ E. Kincaid, In Every War But One. New York: Norton, 1959.

found himself in his silly, mad, foreign way, completely won over by our virtues! 2

The hero does not betray his country. He does not surrender to the enemy. He does not become an other-directed, organization man. He merely gives in to Law. He effects an effortless surrender to the code in a manner similar to William S. Hart's portrayal of the Code of the West in early American films. 3 As the story closes, the hero is just as much an inert thing and as little a person as he was when he was introduced to the reader.

The transition by which the hero surrenders to the law is eloquently expressed in The Face of a Hero (1956):

He had wound up with an impassioned peroration, leaving the leaders of the guilty clique at the mercy of the crowd's contempt. He had come to the end of yet another address delivered against the forces of Evil.... He sat down, still trembling from the effects of his outburst, happy in the knowledge that in ruining his own career he had saved the honor of his profession.

(pp. 220-221.)

In S.O.P.H.I.A. (1959), the "period of results" corresponds to the early days of an organization in the same way that the period of conditioned reflex corresponds to the early stages in the life of an individual.

Imitation ideas would start churning around in an endless circle, sketching a grotesque caricature of the collective spirit that went straight from the embryonic stage to senility without ever coming to genuine maturity, until its material cells eventually disintegrated.

(p. 308).

Forced by circumstances to consciously, explicitly, assume a new role, conditioning is forced through the hero's brain and so results in behavior of a higher cerebral order than that of pure reflex action. Thus, Boulle's heroes accept their second culture over their first.

Boulle represents England as a culture superior to Germany, love as an emotion superior to hate, and Asia as a way of life superior to that of the West. It is interesting, therefore, to see how the author has adopted the principle of functional autonomy to demonstrate this superiority in which he believes. 4 As the following synopses indicate, Boulle's recurrent theme applies Allport's principle to a degree rarely seen in fiction or in life.

The Bridge over the River Kwai (1954). Colonel Nicholson receives orders to surrender to the Japanese. In prisoner-of-war camp, he negotiates with Colonel Saito regarding the basis upon which he will accept responsibility for the construction of a bridge. When the choice comes whether to side with the British agent intent upon destroying the bridge or to protect the bridge, Nicholson chooses the latter course.

'He was always fond of action... just as we all are. This idiotic worship of action, to which our little typists subscribe as much as our great generals! I'm

2/ Pierre Boulle, Not the Glory. New York: Vanguard, 1955, p. 233. All novels of Boulle are published in the U. S. by Vanguard, in translations by Ian Fielding. They will be referred to hereafter when quoted in the text by title, date of publication in English, and page number.

3/ H. A. Grace, "A Taxonomy of American crime film themes," Journal of Social Psychology, 42 (1955), 129-136.

4/ G. W. Allport, "Motivation in personality: Reply to Mr. Berocci," in H. Brand, ed., The Study of Personality (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1954), pp. 92-93.

not sure where it all leads to, when I stop to think about it.' (p. 219).

Not the Glory. William Conrad, a Prussian, swears to avenge his father's death. He is sent to England to ingratiate himself until called upon to perform espionage. Instead of reading his instructions from Germany, he re-enlists in the British Army and dies heroically.

The strange world into which his vocation had cast him a few years before had been slowly encroaching on his personality, its insidious influence mounting round him like the waters of a flood. And now that he was finally going under, even though he realized that he was vanquished and [had] lost his individuality forever, he still could not understand how he had come to give in to this terrible compulsion — he of all people, whose former self would have dismissed such petty incidents with a scornful smile. But he had no means of defending himself against them. (pp. 215-216).

The Test (1957). A French girl is raised by a Malayan family. Having withstood the influence of Japanese occupation, she returns to school in France. When the time comes for her to take her examinations, she breaks down, loses face (as does her Malay-an husband), and dies with her husband.

She found herself out of her depth at once, without being able to swim.... All the usual terrors have been a thousand times worse for her than for the others: the sudden fits of panic in the middle of the night, the cold sweats, the torture of having to hand in a bad report, the guilt complexes; and over and above all these, the injured expression in the eyes of that mother of hers who says nothing but can't help showing her deep disappointment. The mute blackmail of motherly love.... The dislocation of the mind between the horror of being an object of humiliation and the impossibility of keeping up with the pace. (pp. 169-171).

The Other Side of the Coin (1958). A Communist girl, wounded in a raid on a plantation, is shielded by an American and his wife. The agent agrees with the Party to play along with the Europeans. Slowly she changes her behavior in keeping with that expected of a Westerner. At the crisis, she tricks the Communists, arranges for the American wife to be kidnapped, and elopes with the American husband. "One of us, that's what she became," is the concluding comment by a European after the elopement (p. 218).

S.O.P.H.I.A. The hero joins an organization operating in Asia before World War II. He is disturbed to see the attitudes of his superiors and the apparent tragedy which has involved the lives of their families. Gradually he is promoted and becomes one of the administration whose approval must be sought before action may be taken. When a newcomer makes an outstanding proposal for a change in the organization, the hero finds himself enforcing policies rather than accepting change.

Look how well-regulated the world is! How nature has seen to everything! How everything conspires toward the fulfillment of the law! This inevitable sacrifice of yourself, the very idea of which revolts you today, will in time come not only to strike you as right and proper, but you will even burn to accomplish it. You and your ilk will vie with each other as to who will be the first to achieve it within the framework of a collective abstraction. You will never escape it. It is the strongest motive of every action. (p. 309).

In summary, each of Boulle's plots immerses the central character in a new role. The conflict arises between structural motives of an earlier self and functional motives of the current self. The structural motives have been reflexively conditioned, without involvement of the hero's brain. The functional motives

have been consciously learned. As the author portrays the consequences, functional motives predominate at the time of decision.

— H. A. G.

\* \* Lit-Psych in the Saarland

Our old stalwart, John V. Hagopian, who seems to be in the enviable condition of commuting between Ann Arbor and the universities of Germany, is now installed at the Anglistisches Institut der Universität des Saarlandes in Saarbrücken. He writes,

You may be interested to hear that I am offering a set of lectures and a Hauptseminar here on Lit-Psych, both also listed as offerings of the Psych. Dept. under the kindly aegis of Professor Ernst Boesch.... However, I don't think my course would fully meet with your approval. If L & P's editorial values reflect your own, as I suspect they do, then you are much too rigid and old-fashioned a Freudian to be much pleased with adventures in experimental psychology, in laboratory studies of conditioning, perception, electro-neural patterns, etc. On the other hand, I am no longer much pleased with the mystic-mythic mumbo-jumbo of id, ego, superego, Oedipus Complex, Death-Wish, etc....

\* \* Lit-Psych in Maryland

Another old friend, Richard B. Hovey, reports on a course which he gave this spring at the University of Maryland and which will become a regular graduate offering of the English Department:

English 242, Studies in Twentieth Century Literature, is a graduate seminar admitting candidates for the M. A. or the Ph. D. During the spring of 1961 the studies focused on the relations between dynamic depth psychology and certain recent British and American writers. The central question was: what are the uses and values of applying such psychology to the study and criticism of literature? This was the initial offering of the course — a pioneering venture and admittedly experimental. But I was pleasantly surprised by the students' achievement. Perhaps the success was due in part to the modesty of its aims and to the gradualism of its procedures.

A questionnaire proved my assumption: that the majority of the students had done almost no reading in the psychologists and generally had a superficial and imprecise knowledge of Freud and his fellows. Toward meeting this lack, I devoted about the first third of the course to lectures on the psychology of the unconscious while the students were reading selections from Freud and Jung. During these meetings I also stressed certain caveats: (1) that since we were making a beginning, our attitude should combine benevolent scepticism and intellectual humility; (2) that the sophomore pastime of pasting Freudian labels and toying with psychoanalytic concepts was altogether too easy and usually fruitless; (3) that the critic's tools of depth psychology readily lend themselves to misuse — to reductive and either-or arguments, to over-ingenuous interpretations, to rigidly doctrinaire conclusions, to tricky symbol-hunting, to infatuation with pretentious and inexpressive jargon, to reducing literature to airy speculations or case histories or pat formulas; (4) that we were primarily students of literature, secondarily students of psychology; (5) that of psycho-literary criticism we ask, as we do of all criticism, does it help us to understand and experience what is in the work itself? Up to this point, I kept the students pretty well under thumb.

The pedagogical thumb was somewhat relaxed as we moved into the second phase of the work: round-table discussions, led by the instructor, of individual works influenced by or expressive of depth psychology. To sample the various genres, we read together Jones's Hamlet and Oedipus, Strange Interlude, Sons and Lovers, Brooks's The Ordeal of Mark Twain, Prescott's The Poetic Mind, and a selection of poems.

In the final third of the course the students were on their own. They gave oral reports on dramas, novels, biographies, critical works, and poetry. These reports eventuated as papers—not research projects but essays demonstrating the use of psychology in the critical interpretation of individual works. The topics ranged from oedipal variations in Desire under the Elms, to dream symbology in William Inge, to criminal pathology in Greene's Brighton Rock, to the Freudian insights of Newton Arvin in his Herman Melville, to a Jungian critique of Fiedler's Love and Death in the American Novel, etc.

Of the eleven papers, nine were satisfactory—or more than that. They were sane, unpretentious, worth while, sometimes interesting. A couple of them might even be publishable. Evidently, my lectures had filled the bill; the caveats had done their work, and our lively discussions had been profitable. The chief reasons for our modest success, though, was my luck in having the sort of students who bring the best out of any teacher. R. B. H.

Dr. Hovey has also provided the list of paperbacks which he used as textbooks for the course. His sources in theory were: Calvin Hall's Primer of Freudian Psychology (Mentor), Freud's General Introduction (Washington Square), Frieda Fordham's Introduction to Jung's Psychology (Pelican), and Jones's Hamlet and Oedipus (Anchor). The Fordham book is not familiar to your Editor; if it provides a clear, succinct introduction to Jung, it fills a long-felt need.

#### \* \* Pointing with Pride

Impressed by the growing number of Lit-Psych courses being offered, we looked back at the responses to our first requests for such listings, particularly Mrs. Fleissner's letter (I, 2, 5):

I doubt that you will find many colleges where courses dealing with our subject are offered. There may be an occasional course in psychology where reference to literature is made, but the literature departments—though the subject may be discussed in several courses among other topics—will hardly emphasize it in their catalogue descriptions.

And that got us to thinking about the methods of "bootlegging" our viewpoint into innocuously labelled courses (on which we may have something to say in a later issue) and about some of the earlier courses that were offered. And when we examined Roy Basler's description of the course he offered at Peabody before 1948 (I, 3, 8) great was our surprise to see how closely it paralleled the recent courses described by Professors Le Roy and Hovey.

L & P has indeed come a long way since 1951; yet it is amazing how much of our present position was foreshadowed, even embodied, in our earlier years. We have indicated this to some extent in our suggested "homework" in connection with the leading articles. The systematic re-statement of the tenets of ego psychology put your Editor in mind of an early editorial conference he had in 1951 with Eleanor Nicholes. She, loyal disciple of Ernst Kris that she was, considered it a matter of course that we would always be on the lookout for evidence of the impact of ego psychology on critical theory and practice. Your Editor, to conceal his abysmal ignorance, nodded sagely and made a mental note that he must find out what ego psychology was and what, if anything, it had to do with depth psychology and literary criticism. His education, begun then and furthered during the years of his association with Louis Fraiberg and Simon Lesser, has been brought nearer to completion by Fraiberg's present paper.

The Holland account of the dynamics of Freud's prejudices also raises (and, we hope, lays to rest) an old wraith, the canard that the editorial prejudices of L & P committed to to an "old-fashioned" doctrinaire Freudian orthodoxy. When our group first met in 1950 under the title "The Psychoanalytic Approach to Lit-

erary Criticism," one of its first acts was to avoid the doctrinaire implications of such a title by adopting the more general "Literature and Psychology." Since then we have published papers with Freudian, Jungian, Adlerian, Sullivanian orientations, some with no perceptible psychodynamic orthodoxy of any sort and even some which expressed disapproval of adherence to any theoretical position. Yet the old charge would raise its head more often than your Editor has thought fit to report in these pages. The present issue, with its examination of Freud as an author, its explication of Kris et al., and its note based on the theories of Gordon Allport, will not, we know, put an end to the canard, but it may be a little more difficult to defend it logically.

And this might be a good opportunity to bring into the open some of the editorial procedures for the selection of most of our leading articles (a few of them, and all of the shorter notes, are published on the sole responsibility of the Editors). The Holland paper was received during the summer of 1960. (Yes, it takes that long to get around to selecting the one accepted paper out of each four we receive.) The note of transmittal from the Editor to the members of the Editorial Committee:

This is, I think, potentially one of the most important papers we have ever received. . . . If Holland is right, and I think he is, this paper would clear up an immense amount of misunderstanding about Freudian literary criticism. He has covered here . . . material which is the subject of Lou Fraiberg's ["Freud's Writings on Art"], but his focus is different and his aim different and more limited. Furthermore, I don't think something like this can be said too often. . . . This paper has just been read by a psychoanalyst friend of mine, who was much impressed, pointing out the parallel between Mann (bourgeois vs. artist) and Freud (scientist vs. artist).

From William Wasserstrom:

Say Yes and propose that it be retitled "Freud and the Poet's Eye" (the original title was "Freud, Shakespeare and the Poet's Eye"). Prefer not to quibble about matters of specific speculation which Holland sees one way and which might be seen more than one other way. Essay says well what's on Holland's mind and is worth attention.

From Helmut E. Gerber:

This is good. It brings together persuasively, as so many fit-psa papers do not, Freud's theories, analysis of Freud's mind, and literature.

From Louis Fraiberg:

I have just read Holland's paper. . . . and I find it very good. Use it, by all means.

The development of Freud's psychic pattern is carried out most convincingly by Holland, though I could wish for a longer paper with more documentation. [The documentation has since been supplied.] I am most interested in the way Holland shows Freud's ambivalence as between art and science. He suggests a synthesis at the end, but the paper itself presents only the case for incompatibility. This is the chief negative criticism I have and the reason for wishing it longer and fuller. I think the case for synthesis, integration—call it what you will—is still to be made in Holland's paper.

On the other hand, I believe that Freud actually did achieve such a reconciliation of apparently opposing tendencies. As far as his attitude toward artists is concerned, I have the impression—this is another of the researches I don't have time for—that the admira-

tion outweighed the diminution. In other words, Freud valued the artist for his art, not merely for his psychic insights, and this was the dominant tone of his thoughts on the subject. Even when apparently derogatory remarks occur, I believe they must be seen in this light. After all, while Freud was a scientist—and a careful one—he was not mechanically rigid. In any case, the nature of his subject was such that nothing human was excluded. What I am saying is that we need not simply quotation but exegesis. And the whole problem must be studied biographically, that is, chronologically. There may be no time in the id, but there is in Freud's life. Finally, it occurs to me that the idea of Freud's ambivalence, which Holland brings so impressively to our attention, suggests a basis for the dual principle in psychoanalysis itself, the interaction between Eros and Thanatos. To me, however, it indicates something more fundamental than the reason one individual might have had for deciding upon the design of a theoretical principle. It seems to me that it is merely one case of the universal polarity of thought which underlies the ambivalence toward particular psychic entities.

From Gordon Smith:

I agree that by all means it should be published. I was quite charmed by Holland's analyzing the analyzer.

Naturally, it would not be possible—nor tactful—to publish most of our editorial correspondence, but this interchange will give our readers and contributors, whatever their viewpoint, some idea of the careful scrutiny their contributions receive.

\* \* Meeting (First Notice)

The 1961 meeting of Discussion Group General Topics 10 has been tentatively set for Tuesday, December 28, from 10:45 a. m. to 12:00 noon in the Crystal Room of the Palmer House in Chicago. The papers to be presented and the discussion leader will be announced in our next issue.

\* \* Offprint available

Professor Holland's "Freud on Shakespeare" is noted above as indispensable reading in connection with his leading article in this issue. It has been reprinted as Publications in the Humanities 47 by MIT. The reprint is available to anyone who will send the author a self-addressed stamped envelope large enough to hold a 6 x 9 pamphlet. (The same author's "Kafka's 'Metamorphosis': Realism and Unrealism" [MFS, Summer 1958], is also reprinted as No. 34 in the same series.) Professor Holland writes of the Freud paper, "It's in nice primer-size, easy-to-read print because of the exigencies of photo-reproduction." Which led your Editor to reread the first offset-printed issue of L&P. Does anybody (or, perhaps, did anybody) ever read the important Freud Centenary Issue (VI, 4)? (We have given three "homework" assignments in it above.) Would it be advisable—it would certainly be expensive—to reprint that issue in more legible form?

## FREUD AND THE POET'S EYE

Freud's ambivalence toward writers and artists has long hung as a skeleton in the closet of psychoanalytic criticism. To bring it out again would be tactless, except that it helps anatomize two things: first, the tone of the ambivalence, and second, the Master's own character and what in him led to his discovering psychoanalysis. Analyzing Freud's psyche is a doubtful business at best, at worst gross rebellion. As Freud himself replied when he was shown a hostile book which purported to discover his own complexes:

You taught me language; and my profit on't  
Is, I know how to curse.

Nevertheless, despite this cautionary tale, I find it hard to forego pointing out that the remark applies equally well to Freud himself. Freud learned his language from the poets ("Not I, but the poets discovered the unconscious"); then he faced the other way and called the poets daydreaming children.

Yet, in all of Freud's discoveries and all of his life literature played an important part. At least three biographers have insisted that had he not turned to psychology, he would have become a writer. In school, he was fascinated by words and style, and when courting Martha Bernays he wrote to her of vague "literary stirrings." In later life, his friends noted "his astonishing knowledge of literature" and "his memory, especially for Shakespeare." Busy as he was, Freud read voraciously and kept up friendships with a number of literary figures. He seems even to have suggested whimsically that he become a novelist so as to do justice to his own case histories. His writings are permeated with literary quotations, examples, and insights, and in describing his own dreams, fantasies, and free associations, he is constantly taken on literary excursions, so intimately was literature woven into his emotional life. /1

Nevertheless, for all his skill and interest in things literary, Freud shows a curious reticence toward artists and writers. At various points in his writings, he insists that before the problem of the creative writer, analysis must "lay down its arms" /2 (and the military metaphor, "die Waffen strecken," is not without point). "It [analysis] can do nothing towards elucidating the nature of the artistic gift, nor can it explain the means by which the artist works — artistic technique." /3 Perhaps not, but analysts — and Freud himself — seem to have done quite a bit to break the taboo. Freud's reluctance to probe the writer's "gift" is part of a more general pattern of ambivalence. That is, he admires writers and artists greatly, but at the same time, he

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1/ Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, 3 vols. (New York: Basic Books, 1953-1957, hereafter cited as Jones), II, 256, 405; III, 418, 427. Helen Walker Puner, Freud: His Life and Mind (New York: Howell, Soskin, 1947), pp. 57-58. Theodore Reik, "Psychoanalytic Experiences in Life, Literature and Music," in The Search Within (New York: Grove Press, 1956), pp. 387-388. Fritz Wittels, Sigmund Freud, His Personality, His Teaching, and His School, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1924), pp. 19-20.

2/ "Dostoevsky and Parricide" (1928): Gesammelte Werke, 18 vols. (London: Imago Publishing Co., 1940-41, hereafter cited as GW), XIV, 399; Collected Papers, trans. and ed. Joan Rivière, 5 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1924-1950, hereafter cited as CP), V, 222; Standard Edition, trans. James Strachey, Anna Freud, Alix Strachey, and Alan Tyson, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953 — , hereafter cited as SE), XXI.

3/ An Autobiographical Study (1925 [1924]); GW, XIV, 91; SE, XX, 65.

compares them invidiously to scientists, calls them children, likens their creations to daydreams, and assigns them venal motives.

What Freud admires in the writer are his powers as a seer, his ability to grasp intuitively truths the psychologist gets at only by hard work. As early as 1895, he wrote, "Local diagnosis and electrical reactions lead nowhere in the study of hysteria, whereas a detailed description of mental processes such as we are accustomed to find in the works of imaginative writers enables me, with the use of a few psychological formulas, to obtain at least some kind of insight." /4 "Story-tellers," he wrote in Delusion and Dream, "are valuable allies, and their testimony is to be rated high, for they usually know many things between heaven and earth that our academic wisdom does not even dream of." Writers could see, for example, the "necessary conditions for loving" before psychologists could. Shakespeare had understood the meaning of slips of the tongue long before Freud, and not only that, he had assumed that his audiences would understand, too. The writer, however, knows these things "through intuition—really from a delicate self-observation," while Freud himself had to learn them through "laborious work." /5

At the same time, however, he says over and over again (devoting an entire essay, "Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming," to the idea) that art and literature are like a child's game, a glorified daydream, a mild narcotic, an illusion offering an escape from reality into fantasy. "Meaning," he wrote of visual artists, "is but little to these men: all they care for is line, shape, agreement of contours. They are given up to the Lustprinzip." /6 It is at this point that critics such as Roger Fry and Lionel Trilling have objected most strenuously. Fry demands that the "pure" appreciation of aesthetic form, not the fantasy or "literary content" be the prime motive behind art. But Freud is, in effect, adamant. The artist adapts his own daydreams to provide others with a sorry substitute for instinctual pleasures that reality forbids. In this roundabout way the artist wins by fantasies what he was too weak to win in reality, "honor, power, and the love of women." His motives and his audience's are venal; there is no such thing as art for art's sake. /7 Trilling has pointed out that writers are preoccupied with reality, but Freud's view is squarely contrary. Art is pure pleasure principle—"harmless and benevolent; it does not seek to be anything else but an illusion"—while science is "the most complete renunciation of the pleasure

4/ With Josef Breuer, Studies in Hysteria (1893-95); GW, I, 227; SE, II, 160-161.

5/ Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's 'Gradiva' (1907); GW, VII, 33; SE, IX, 8. "A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men" (1910); GW, VIII, 66; CP, IV, 192; SE, XI, 165. Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916-1917), Lecture II; GW, XI, 31-32; SE, XV-XVI; A General Introduction to Psycho-analysis, trans. Joan Rivière (New York: Garden City Publishing Co., 1945), pp. 35-36. Letter to Arthur Schnitzler, 14 May 1922, "Sigmund Freud, Briefe an Arthur Schnitzler," Die Neue Rundschau, LXVI (1955), 96-97.

6/ "Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming" (1908); GW, VII, 213; CP, IV, 173; SE, IX, 143. Civilization and its Discontents (1930); GW, XIV, 437-458; SE, XXI; trans. Joan Rivière (London: Hogarth Press, 1930), pp. 33-35. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920); GW, XIII, 15; SE, XVIII, 17. Letter to Ernest Jones; Jones, III, 412.

7/ Roger Fry, The Artist and Psycho-Analysis (London: Hogarth Press, 1924). Autobiographical Study (n. 3); SE, XX, 64-65. "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning" (1911), sec. 6; GW, VIII, 256-257; CP, IV, 19, SE, XII, 224. Introductory Lectures (n. 5), Lecture XXIII, trans. Rivière, pp. 327-328. Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1909-1910); GW, VIII, 52; SE, XI, 50.

principle of which our mental capacity is capable." Where the artist tries to fantasy a world into being, the scientist tries to strip fantasies off the world of being. /8

And yet Freud also felt that artists had a special insight into psychic truth. Freud, Ernest Jones says, "seemed to take the romantic view of [artists] as mysterious beings with a super-human, almost divine afflatus." "This was occasionally tinged with a trace of envy for their superior gifts." /9 The symptom of the envy is that Freud practically never makes a simple statement of the artist's gifts with the necessary qualifications. Instead, the artist is either exalted as a prophet beyond analysis or reduced to a child daydreaming. He is either a seer of reality or an avatar of the pleasure principle and, hence, ultimately, of sexual gratification. These two extreme views, the artist as hedonist and the artist as truth-seeker were, for emotional reasons, closely linked in Freud's own psyche.

Curiosity was the most basic motive in his own character. "His insatiable desire," wrote Helen Walker Puner, "was the desire for knowledge." He himself said, "In my youth I felt an overpowering need to understand something of the riddles of the world in which we live." "I was moved... by a sort of curiosity, which was, however, more directed towards human concerns than towards natural objects." /10 Over and over again in Freud's early life, alongside the transformation of his infantile curiosity, the theme of knowledge as power, the omnipotence of thoughts, recurs. Late in his life he described one of the chief purposes of analytic thinking as the attempt "to master the matter of the outer world psychically" (and as he pointed out in the General Introduction, "matter" tends to stand for mater). /11

Freud's passion [writes Jones] to get at the truth with the maximum of certainty, was, I again suggest, the deepest and strongest motive in his nature and the one that impelled him toward his pioneering achievements. What truth? And why was the desire so overwhelming? In his study of Leonardo, Freud maintained that the child's desire to know is fed by powerful motives arising in his infantile curiosity about the primary facts of life, the meaning of birth and what has brought it about. It is commonly animated by the appearance of a rival child who displaces him in his mother's attention and to some extent in her love.

Jones points out that there was such a figure in Freud's life, his sister Anna, and he goes on to suggest that knowing the truth meant security to the boy, the security of the absolute possession of the mother. Crucial in this search was Freud's half-brother Philipp, much given to jokes, as in the screen-memory of the cupboard,

which for the last twenty-nine years has been turning up from time to time in my conscious memory without my

8/ Lionel Trilling, "Freud and Literature" (1940, 1947), The Liberal Imagination (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953). Beyond the Pleasure Principle (n. 6), loc. cit. "Special Type" (n. 5), loc. cit. New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933); GW, XV, 173; SE, XXII; trans. W. J. H. Sprott and James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1933), p. 219. "On Psychotherapy" (1905 [1904]); GW, V, 17; CP, I, 253-254; SE, VII, 260-261.

9/ Jones, II, 544; III, 408.

10/ Puner (n. 1), p. 55. "Postscript to a Discussion on Lay Analysis" (1927); GW, XIV, 290; CP, V, 208; Autobiographical Study (n. 3); GW, XIV, 54; SE, XX, 8.

11/ Address delivered in the Goethe House in Frankfort (1950); GW, XIV, 550; SE, XXI.

understanding it. I was crying my heart out because my mother was nowhere to be found. My brother Philipp (who is twenty years older than I) opened a cupboard [Kasten] for me, and when I found that mother was not there I cried still more, until she came through the door, looking slim and beautiful.

(It is not surprising that Freud was later drawn to write about die Kästchenwahl in The Merchant of Venice.) Symbolically, the cupboard meant pregnancy, the threat of another child (hence the importance of his mother's appearing "slim and beautiful"). Peering into the cupboard symbolized his infantile curiosity about the secrets of pregnancy, known to Philipp, "whom," Dr. Jones says, "he suspected of being his mother's mate and whom he tearfully begged not to make his mother again pregnant." /12

Eyes and other images of looking run like a leitmotiv through Freud's life and works. "His most striking feature," his friend Joan Rivière wrote, "was the forward thrust of his head and critical exploring gaze of his keenly piercing eyes." Greatly interested in the visual and verbal arts, he was almost totally uninterested in music. He failed (and was puzzled by his failure) to see the potentialities of cocaine as a local anaesthetic for operations of the eye. Though he saw that blindness symbolized castration; curiously enough, he did not apply his insight to the Oedipus myth until 1914, after it had been pointed out by others, even though he himself had earlier used such phrases as "brings to light" or "seek to close our eyes" when in 1900 he first described the repression in the myth. /13

Visual metaphors abound in his writings. For example, he described his self-analysis as having "days when a flash of lightning illuminates [erhellst] the picture." He described Die Traumdeutung as "planned on the model of an imaginary walk" /14:

First comes the dark wood of authorities (who cannot see the trees), where there is no clear view and it is very easy to go astray. Then there is a cavernous defile through which I lead my readers — my collection of specimens with its peculiarities, its details, its indiscretions, and its bad jokes — and then, all at once, the high ground and the prospect, and the question: 'Which way do you want to go?'

(As he himself might have pointed out for another, his description of his researches symbolizes the same infantile curiosity about female anatomy as the screen-memory of the cupboard.) In analyzing one of his dreams (the 'Three Fates'), he associated with the third Fate his mother's "ocular demonstration" that we are all made of earth. (The three Fates carry us back again to "The Three Caskets" essay.) On the other hand, at the time of his father's funeral, he dreamed of a placard which said "You are requested to close the eyes." In still another dream (the 'non vixit'), eyes become a kind of weapon: "I then gave P. a piercing

12/ Jones, II, 433-44. The Origins of Psychoanalysis: Letters, Drafts and Notes to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1902, eds. Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, Ernst Kris; trans. Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1954, hereafter cited as Origins), 15 October 1897. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901), Ch. IV; GW, IV, 58-60; SE, VI, 50-52.

13/ Jones, II, 405. Theodore Reik, From Thirty Years with Freud trans. Richard Winston (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1940), p. 17. Reik (n. 1), pp. 386-388. Jones, I, Ch. VI. Compare Freud's letter to Fritz Wittels, 15 August 1924, Selected Letters, ed. Ernst L. Freud (New York: Basic Books, 1950), pp. 350-351. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), V (D) and VI (E); GW, II/III, 269-270 and 403n.; SE, IV, 263, and V, 398n.

14/ Origins, 27 October 1897; 6 August 1899.

look. Under my eyes he turned pale; his form grew indistinct and his eyes a sickly blue — and finally he melted away." In still a third dream (the 'botanical monograph', associated with his paper on cocaine and its use in eye operations), he recalled a letter from Fliess which said that he could see Die Traumdeutung finished; Freud apostrophizes, "How much I envied him his gift as a seer [Sehergabe]! If only I could have seen it lying finished before me!" <sup>15</sup> Eyes are here associated with scientific research. In the New Introductory Lectures, they become the mind itself; Freud's diagram of the hypothetic topography of id, ego, and superego looks exactly like the cross-section of an eye.

To do research is to look into; to be a poet, on the other hand, is to be looked at. Thus, in the Preface to the first edition of Die Traumdeutung, Freud reluctantly agreed to "reveal to the public gaze more of the intimacies of my mental life... than is normally necessary for any writer who is a man of science and not a poet." In his letter to Fliess of May 31, 1897, he pointed out the similarity of creative writing and hysterical fantasizing, using the rather Oedipal situation of young Werther as an example. He headed the paragraph, "Dichtung und Fine Frenzy," and remarked at the end, "So Shakespeare was right in his juxtaposition of poetry and madness (the fine frenzy)." This is a curious failure to quote. Much closer to Freud's meaning would be other phrases from the same passage, like "such seething brains, such shaping fantasies" or the famous

And as imagination bodies forth  
The forms of things unknown . . .

Instead, he recalled the phrase "fine frenzy" which does not refer to "madness" as such, but to "The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling."

Just as this passage links the lover's sight and the poet's, so for Freud seeing (either in a physical sense or in the metaphorical sense of understanding) is associated with his libidinal drives. (He recalled during his self-analysis a journey at two-and-a-half with his mother "during which we spent a night together and I must have had the opportunity of seeing her nudam.") <sup>16</sup> Seeing and knowing seem to have had for Freud (as for most men) the value of seeing the mother and, by discovering her secrets, possessing her. They suggest, in short, sexual power. Freud's tendency to endow the artist with greater powers of insight than the scientist means symbolically that the artist has greater sexual abilities, since he knows some secret.

Freud did say, on intellectual grounds, that the artist had an especially strong sexual drive: he finds "one of the origins of artistic activity" to be the sublimation of "excessively strong excitations." "The artist is originally a man who turns from reality because he cannot come to terms with the demand for the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction as it is first made." The artist "is one who is urged on by instinctual needs which are too clamorous." "An abstinent artist is scarcely conceivable," he wrote. "An abstinent young intellectual (for example, Freud himself) is by no means a rarity. The young intellectual can by abstinence enhance his powers of concentration, whereas the production of the artist is probably powerfully stimulated by his sexual experience." <sup>17</sup>

Freud's feeling that the ordinary intellectual is subordinate sexually to the artist may have caused what Jones calls "the im-

<sup>15/</sup> Interpretation of Dreams (1900), V (B-iv), VI (C), VI (F), & V (A); GW, II/III, 211, 322-323, 424, and 177; SE, IV, 205, 517-518; V, 421-422, and VI, 172. Also Origins, 2 November 1896.

<sup>16/</sup> Origins, 3 October 1897.

<sup>17/</sup> Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905); GW, V, 140; SE, VII, 258-259. "Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness" (1908); GW, VII, 160; CP, II, 92; SE, IX, 197.

mense capacity for jealousy he manifested during his engagement." For example, when he was tormented by jealousy on account of one Fritz Wahle (an artist), he wrote:

I think there is a general enmity between artists and those engaged in the details of scientific work. We know that they possess in their art a master key to open with ease all female hearts, whereas we stand helpless at the strange design of the lock and have first to torment ourselves to discover a suitable key to it. /18

The image of lock and key (aside from its suggestion of phallus and vagina) makes the artist, like the scientist, a discoverer. He is a "psychological explorer of the depths," and "One may heave a sigh at the thought that it is vouchsafed to a few with hardly an effort, to salve from the whirlpool of their emotions the deepest truths, to which we others have to force our way, ceaselessly groping amid torturing uncertainties." /19

This mingling of admiration and envy for the artist is only one instance of a general ambivalence basic to Freud's personality. "My emotional life," he pointed out in his analysis of the 'non vixit' dream (in which eyes became weapons), "has always insisted that I should have an intimate friend and a hated enemy . . . and it not infrequently happened that the ideal situation of childhood has been so completely reproduced that friend and enemy have come together in a single individual." This childhood situation was "his relations in childhood with a nephew who was a year my senior . . . my superior . . . I early learned to defend myself against him." He played Brutus to his senior's Caesar in what Jones calls a "pronouncedly parricidal" duologue of Schiller's. In analyzing the 'non vixit' dream, Freud hypothesized a scene with his nephew in which "the two children had a dispute about some object . . . Each of them claimed to have got there before the other." /20

As this dream and the other quotations suggest, behind Freud's ambivalence toward artists lies his own drive toward the potency of discovery. Discovery in childhood seemed to promise complete possession of the mother; for the adult it held "honor, power, and the love of women." Yet, both emotionally and intellectually, Freud's discoveries led him to the dispiriting conclusion that artists saw intuitively, easily, what he as scientist had to grope for. Moreover, the artist "got there before the other." For ordinary men, Freud reflected in analyzing the 'non vixit' dream, isn't "having children our only path to immortality?" In the Leonardo essay, however, he noted, "The creative artist feels toward his works like a father," and "What an artist creates provides at the same time an outlet for his sexual desire."

Ultimately, then, the artist is for Freud a kind of hero-king-creator who achieves immortality through his artistic progeny and his discoveries. He is the "great man," more powerfully endowed sexually, who "got there before the other," who "has the master key to open with ease all female hearts, whereas we stand helpless at the strange design of the lock," who, "with hardly an effort" gets at "the deepest truths, to which we others have to force our way, ceaselessly groping amid torturing uncertainties."

The artist, in short, is the father in the most primal, terrible sense of all, and Freud's ambivalence toward the artist is thus simple the ambivalence of the son for the father. As he himself said in his Goethe-Preis essay of 1930, we have a need to establish affective relations with great men, a need to link them

18/ Jones, I, 111; II, 433.

19/ Letter to Schnitzler (n. 5). Civilization and its Discontents (1930), Ch. VII; GW, XIV, 495; SE, XXI; trans. Joan Rivière (New York: Doubleday Anchor, n. d.), p. 89.

20/ Interpretation of Dreams (1900), VI (H): GW, II/III, 497-500; SE, V, 483-487. Jones, I, 25.

with the fathers, teachers, and others whose influence we have felt. At the same time, however, our relations to such fathers and teachers is ambivalent; we admire, but we also resent them. Freud acted out this ambivalence by exalting the artist-father and at the same time shrinking him to a daydreaming child, the son changing roles with the father as sons, he said, wish to do.

Freud's attitude toward his favorite writer, Shakespeare, will serve as a paradigm for this sense of the artist as father and also suggest the importance of Freud's ambivalence toward artists in the discovery of psychoanalysis. Freud vastly admired Shakespeare's plays. He first began to read them at the age of eight, read them over and over again, and all his life, with a facility that professional Shakespearians might envy, he could come up with an apt quotation. His books fairly bristle with illustrations from Shakespeare. His famous analysis of Hamlet, for example, occurs in the very same letter (October 15, 1897) as his discovery of the Oedipus complex itself. Freud must have been thinking of Hamlet and Oedipus Rex, almost expecting Sophocles and Shakespeare to guide him in his self-analysis.

The hostile component of his attitude toward Shakespeare took the form of irrationally denying Shakespeare his identity: "The name William Shakespeare is very certainly a pseudonym, behind which a great mysterious stranger [ein grosser Unbekannter—the father?] is hidden." /21/ Although Ernest Jones and James Strachey remonstrated, although Freud knew that scholars thought such pseudonym theories absurd, although he had to give up the convenient fact that "Shakespeare wrote Hamlet very soon after his father's death," /22/ Freud persisted in proclaiming the true Shakespeare in a variety of writings.

An early form of attack was to make the bard into a Frenchman. "He insisted," Jones reports, "that his countenance could not be that of an Anglo-Saxon but must be French, and he suggested that the name was a corruption of Jacques Pierre." Shakespeare's name is fairly phallic, and Freud might well have pointed out (were he analyzing someone else) that the name was now, in effect, gelded; he did, of course, point out that destroying a man's name symbolizes destroying the man himself. Also, since he greatly admired the English, and rather disliked the French, the attempt to make Shakespeare French is at least covertly an attempt to degrade him. /23/

In his sixties, Freud rejected the Baconian hypothesis and attached himself to J. T. Looney's idea that Shakespeare was Edward de Vere, Earl of Oxford, a man whom Freud described as "passionately disordered," "somewhat déclassé," "an inadequate father who never did his duty by his children," a "squanderer of his inheritance and a miserable manager of his affairs, oppressed by debts," and a cuckold. Jones points out that "Something in Freud's mentality led him to take a special interest in people not being what they seemed to be," for example, Shakespeare, Moses, and Leonardo's mother and stepmother. Dr. Jones sees in this tendency a "variant of the Family Romance" and relates it to Freud's confusions in the complicated household of his childhood as to which of the older men around him really was his father. /24/

Doubting that Shakespeare was Shakespeare, however, was no isolated aberration or special by-product of Freud's ambivalence toward artists. On the contrary, Freud's Oxfordian, Baconian,

21/ An Outline of Psycho-Analysis (1940 [1938]); GW, XVII, 119n., SE, XXIII; trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1949), p. 96 n.

22/ Autobiographical Study (n. 3); GW, XIV, 89-90, 96 n.; SE, XX, 63-64. Jones, II, 428; III, xii.

23/ Jones, I, 15, 21, 24, 178-179, and 184.

24/ Jones, III, 458. Loc. cit. n. 11. Jones, III, 428-430; II, 435; I, 10-11.

and Jacques-Pierrian vagaries represent a basic pattern in his thinking. Jones lists, as related eccentricities, Freud's faith in Lamarckian evolution, telepathy, and the occult. Freud himself associated the question of telepathy to the Bacon-Shakespeare controversy, calling them two themes that "always perplexed him to distraction." Jones suggests that these aberrations are possibly all aspects of a single feeling that "things are not what they seem to be" behind which lies a wish that "a certain part of reality could be changed," presumably by just thinking it changed. That is, telepathy, the occult, or the Lamarckian belief that acquired mental characteristics can be inherited, are all pretty clearly related to the "omnipotence of thought." Freud is thinking, like the infant or the savage, that wishes can directly change reality. /25

A less friendly analyst of Freud's personality than Ernest Jones, Erich Fromm, points to other elements. /26 Freud had, he says, an extreme dependency on the mother's (or some subsequent woman's) love; it made him, among other things, arrive for trains an hour early—one might mention also his fear of open spaces (agoraphobia) "which troubled me much in my younger years." Fromm also notes a strong urge to replace the father, to supplant existing authorities with his own, to be a world-reformer. Fromm says Freud's strongest need was to dominate his instincts by reason and that doing so, Freud felt, was a condition for becoming, as he wished to do, one of the world's elect. Fromm's analysis suggests another reason why Freud was especially resentful of artists. The artist is a man who most notably does not curb his instincts, but wins the mother-woman anyway and becomes the father-authority anyway.

We can, I think, join these two explanations, Jones's and Fromm's, by recalling that Freud charged insight, thought, and discovery with the value of power, particularly the sexual power of the father, and that he regarded this power as peculiarly the possession of the artist or writer. In his artistic fantasies, "He actually becomes the hero, king, creator, favorite, he desired to be without pursuing [like the scientist] the circuitous path of creating real alterations in the outer world." "Art constitutes a region half-way between a reality which frustrates wishes and the wish-fulfilling world of the imagination—a region in which, as it were, primitive man's strivings for omnipotence are still in full force." "Satisfaction is obtained through illusions, which are recognized as such, without the discrepancy between them and reality being allowed to interfere with the pleasure they give." /27 In other words, where the scientist slowly, laboriously, achieves his ends by changes in the real world, the writer merely fantasies a changed world into being. Telepathy, the occult, and a Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics bridge this dualism of body and mind. They occupy a kind of middle ground between the scientist who changes reality by knowing about it and the artist who "knows" a reality into being. All three make wishes more than artistic fantasies—all three make wishes directly affecting the material world of the scientist.

In this context, Freud's reason for rejecting Bacon as the author of Shakespeare's plays is suggestive: "Then Bacon would have been the most powerful brain the world has ever produced,

25/ Jones, I, 1-11; II, 455; III, xii, 313, 381, and 428-450.

26/ Erich Fromm, Sigmund Freud's Mission, World Perspectives Series, Vol. XXI, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959). Cp. Theodore Reik, Listening with the Third Ear (1948) (New York: Grove Press, 1956), pp. 15-16.

27/ "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning" (1911), sec. 6; GW, VIII, 256-257; CP, IV, 19; SE, XII, 224. "The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest" (1915), sec. II (f); GW, VIII, 416-417; SE, XIII, 187-188. Civilization and its Discontents (1930); GW, XIV, 458; SE, XXI; trans. Joan Rivière (London: Hogarth Press, 1950), p. 35.

whereas it seems to me that there is more need to share Shakespeare's achievement among several rivals than to burden another important man with it." /28 In effect, Freud is saying it would be intolerable for one "great man" (or father) to have so much creative potency. It was much more satisfying for the "great mysterious stranger" to be Edward de Vere, cuckolded husband and inadequate father. In effect, too, Freud is turning a wish, a mere "need," into a discoverable fact. Most important, by rejecting Bacon, Freud reserved the unique role of artist-scientist for himself.

That is, by creating psychoanalysis, Freud became both the scientist who changes reality through knowledge and the artist who fantasies a changed reality into being. The letters to Fliess and the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement pinpoint the crucial transition. At first, Freud thought neuroses came from actual sexual experiences in childhood. Then various factors ruled this explanation out: "Analysis had led back to these infantile sexual traumas by the right path, and yet they were not true. The firm ground of reality was gone." And Freud was led to posit what has since turned out to be the most seminal premise in the mind of the twentieth century, at once the most broadening and the most limiting assumption of the Age of Freud: "Psychical reality requires to be taken into account alongside actual reality." /29 As he first phrased it in his letter to Fliess of September 21, 1897, there is a clear relation to literature in his "definite realization that there is no 'indication of reality' in the unconscious, so that it is impossible to distinguish between truth and emotionally-charged fiction [die mit Affekt besetzte Fiktion]."

Thus, there are strong links in Freud's psyche between resentfully emulating writers of fiction and developing psychoanalysis. Originally, in fact, analysis was called the "cathartic" method, and the long-term effect of analysis is not unlike the short-term effect of drama. Freud himself recognized the quasi-artistic basis for psychoanalysis' free association in a quotation from Schiller he inserted in The Interpretation of Dreams in 1909, and in 1920 Freud pointed out that he might have derived the method of free association from an essay of Ludwig Börne's called (significantly) "The Art of Becoming an Original Writer in Three Days." Börne had been a favorite of Freud's when he was fourteen, and other essays by Börne "kept on recurring to his mind for no obvious reason over a long period of years." Yet Freud had forgotten this one. "It seems not impossible," he wrote, "that this hint [that such an essay existed] may have brought to light the fragment of cryptomnesia which in so many cases may be suspected to lie behind apparent originality."

In saying that psychoanalysis may have had the emotional value of an art for Freud, I do not, of course, mean to imply (as experimental psychologists secure in their laboratories of amazed rats and holed pigeons like to do) that psychoanalysis is unscientific, "merely" an art. Showing that Freud felt about Shakespeare or any other artist as about a father-figure does not touch in the slightest the validity of Freud's intellectual conclusions. Explaining Freud's psyche explains to the assiduous critic not so much what he said as how he said it. Explaining Freud's psyche can also show, as psychoanalysis has so often shown for artists, why this particular man was able to think in this particular way and so create the thing he did.

Three themes mingled in the movement of Freud's intelligence. First, there was the driving curiosity, the unrelenting search for the secrets of mind. Second, he was preoccupied (in all his thinking, not just his eccentricities) with the omnipotence of thought, the ability to wish something into being, as in a dream.

28/ Jones, III, 428.

29/ "History" (n. 2); GW, X, 54; CP, I, 299-300; SE, XIV, 17-18.

Third, he identified sight with mind, and both with procreative sexual power. These three themes all merged in the totem of the artist who became a kind of spiritual and intellectual father, both resented and emulated. The result was psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis could probably not have come into being in the heavily physiological atmosphere of medical science at the turn of the century, had it not been for a particular scientist with a particular need to create like an artist and through his intellectual offspring win the immortality that few but artists win. In a very real sense, by creating psychoanalysis, Freud joined to the probing eye of the scientist the creating eye of the poet, giving to airy nothing a local habitation and a name.

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#### NEW VIEWS OF ART AND THE CREATIVE PROCESS IN PSYCHOANALYTIC EGO PSYCHOLOGY

If we recall Philip Wheelwright's definition of the Metaphoric Imagination as that which "fuses heterogeneous elements into some kind of unity" and Lionel Trilling's remark that the mind is "exactly a poetry-making organ," then we see two of the chief ways in which psychoanalytic ego psychology can be useful in the study of literature. For psychoanalysis has developed in the past forty years to the stage where even cultural lag is no longer an excuse for pretending that it can be regarded as merely the key to a cipher. With the new emphases it was given by Freud shortly after World War I, it has become an instrument capable of examining intellectual problems of considerable complexity, and as it proceeds in its study of the ego, it becomes increasingly complex itself. Instead of explaining as symbols single components of psychic processes or simple combinations of them (the common misunderstanding of its function), it is more and more seeing whole constellations of psychic life and their total effects. It is now becoming possible for psychoanalysts and others to study such problems as those of the artist and his materials in ways whose subtleties and insights are not inferior to those we are accustomed to find in the writings of aestheticians and literary critics.

This goes far beyond the examination of a work as only the product of or the appeal to a particular interest. Dominant themes are, of course, very important, but the newer view begins by accepting the work on its own terms as an artistic entity and not simply as the sum of its tendencies.

Psychoanalysis is able to do this by virtue of such concepts as secondary autonomy in ego functions and the conflict-free sphere of the ego, which are based on relatively new hypotheses of energetic origin and activity. No longer are sexuality and aggression the sole determinants of psychic acts. Psychoanalysts now postulate a third kind of energy, either neutral in origin or coming from the other two sources but partially neutralized, and thus available for higher mental functions.

It is time we realized that students of the ego do not see the artist as the prisoner of his impulses nor his art as an uncontrolled form of psychic explosion. Neither do they regard their therapeutic task as simply helping the individual adjust to whatever situation he happens to find himself in. What they are concerned with is establishing an appropriate relationship between individual and environment — and this sometimes requires creative adjustment of the latter to the former. Therefore, both as therapists and as students of the psyche, they are interested in the kind of imaginative invention and reconstruction which is characteristic of the artist.

Rooting itself firmly in classical psychoanalysis, recent ego psychology sees creativity as a natural expression of the psyche with its basic dual and reciprocating motive forces, but it has now reached a stage of sophistication in the formulation of theory which is no longer satisfied with merely accounting for the polar interaction of libidinal and aggressive drives.

A phenomenon so complex as creation requires something less simple than the concept of alternating counter-tensions leading to the dominance of one or to a compromise which fully satisfies neither. Eros and Thanatos remain the foundation of the new theories, but on them is built a superstructure which permits psychoanalysis to achieve a new understanding of large areas of psychic life which lie beyond primary involvement with instinctual drives. By the introduction of a third set of psychic motives the theoretical means have now been made available to examine psychoanalytically a large number of mental acts — including creative thought, with which this discussion is concerned — and to extend significantly our knowledge of them. This new theoretical aid is the concept that psychic energy may be used for purposes independent of its origin in instinctual sources.

The mystery of creativity is still a mystery, but new light is being shed into some of its darkest corners. By looking in a direction away from its biological orientation, psychoanalysis is increasing its ability to cope with certain social aspects of human life on terms which approach more closely than ever before the assumptions of non-psychanalytic thinkers — philosophers, critics, artists. In these areas of study the emphasis is shifting from problems of genesis and development, viewed historically, to those of present process and production, from expression to communication, from individual elements to entire wholes, from the necessary satisfying of instinctual demands to what may fairly be called higher pleasures.

In what is to follow I shall survey the findings and hypotheses of the outstanding workers in the field of psychoanalytic ego psychology as these apply to the problems of creativity. Some of the ideas were originally Freud's, some grew out of his suggestions, and some are new. But the importance of them now is that they dominate psychoanalysis today and seem to afford the greatest potential for its future development. Since this influence is a phenomenon of relatively recent years, the task is barely begun, and consequently the results are inconclusive. Although psychoanalysis is tending toward an all-inclusive theory — Freud made tentative proposals for one even before the publication of The Interpretation of Dreams — it is still a young scientific discipline and has a long way to go. It is too soon to tell what will actually happen to some of the suggestions I shall discuss, but their possibilities will, in most cases, be quite evident.

One of the most interesting revisions of earlier thinking which is emerging from the newer studies in ego psychology is the conception of the artist as a person with a strong ego rather than a weak one. Part of this comes from endowment, part from development. Individual differences prevail throughout life, and they take their pattern from the particular psychic potential with which the individual happens to be born.

The artistic gift, for example, depends in part upon the capacity of the ego to submit itself temporarily to the power of the id, to disengage itself, and to utilize id material for its own higher purposes. If the ego's innate potential is less than such capacity, then the id will simply not permit itself to be used in this way; on the contrary, it will constantly threaten the ego with domination. Presumably, in such a case, the individual concerned could not become an artist, or at least not a very good one. This recognition of the importance of endowment, though it

raises new problems, increases the possibility of further scientific understanding of the uniqueness of the artist, both as a person and as a creator.

This "flexibility of repression" works hand in hand with another endowed ability, the artist's capacity for "multiple and mobile identifications." The latter refers to his power of establishing meaningful emotional connections between himself and other (psychological) objects. It is plain that these two inborn abilities, when they occur in significant strength in one person, make possible a degree of availability and control of psychic material which must be extremely serviceable to any artist.

To these ego psychology has added the study of the innate capacity for sublimation, the transformation of psychic tendencies from forms suitable for the satisfying of basic needs to those which are appropriate for use by the higher mental processes, including creative thought. An important aid in understanding the role of sublimation in art is the concept of neutralization of psychic energy, which, though it derives from a suggestion made by Freud as far back as 1922, is only just coming into general use. It refers to the process by which psychic energy can be more or less freed from its original libidinal or aggressive matrix and thus be made available for other purposes. Some theorists even argue that the individual is born with a store of such uncommitted energy which may be added to later from instinctual sources. Not only the "amount" of creativity but its nature as well may be powerfully affected by the ratio between the three kinds of energy which exists at birth.

The investigation of the specific ways in which psychic endowment contributes to artistic talent has only just begun, but some progress has already been made in two areas: the determination of vocational choice, and the composition of the psychic apparatus which is especially talented in performing functions that facilitate artistic work. The question of why a particular person becomes an artist and the related question of how good an artist he can become are thus being asked in terms which make it possible for psychoanalysis to begin searching for answers. As might be expected in this stage of development, most of the current approaches are theoretical, though based on clinical experience. The suggestion has been made that there are innate differences in the ability to let in or to keep out stimuli, the so-called "stimulus barrier." One study indicates that these differences are related to precocity in ego development generally and to the early development of special gifts in particular. The ability to neutralize psychic energy, also partly a matter of endowment, facilitates the development of the artist's capacity for successful activity.

Besides the potential present at birth, the course of the ego's development is of great importance to the study of the artistic psyche. Recent views emphasize the higher; i. e., the non-instinctual, kinds of mental acts. These include problem solving, reality testing, and creative thinking, all intimately related to art. The role of the instincts in all of these is well-known; for that matter, the knowledge that satisfaction may be gained from the functioning of the psychic apparatus itself is not new. What is new is the focusing of attention on the latter, another instance of psychoanalytic interest in those activities of the psyche which transcend instinctual conflict. It is a matter of some moment that pleasure in artistic form can be sufficient unto itself and that it serves as more than a mere facade for what has been complacently called the "real" psychic content behind it. Conflict is not simply masked; it is joined by non-conflictual forces to help produce the complex we speak of as the aesthetic experience.

Some of this can be recognized in the relation of preconscious thought processes to the secondary process. Preconscious thoughts are those which are repressed; i. e., kept unconscious, not out of psychic necessity but simply for mental convenience. There is

no particular objection to their becoming conscious; there is just not enough room on the stage of consciousness for all of them at once. Consequently, they remain unconscious until attention is directed to them, thus providing them with the energy necessary for emergence.

Since one of the reasons for the slight degree of repression of such thoughts is the fact that they are not involved in instinctual conflicts, they are readily available for use in "just-below-the-surface" (preconscious) thinking and in conscious thinking as well. Their relative freedom from instinctual domination makes them particularly useful in constructions or inventions whose psychic value is on the higher levels of ego performance.

As described in The Interpretation of Dreams, the secondary process (unconsciously) brings a kind of order to the mass of seemingly chaotic dream thoughts, connecting similar elements, providing logical and chronological sequences, and otherwise giving enough form to the dream to enable it to pass the relaxed censorship, which is not nearly so demanding as the waking consciousness on matters relating to correspondence with outer reality. Nevertheless, this process does represent the first rudimentary influences of reason and external experience upon the direct expression of the id impulses. As such it is the prototype of the later conscious elaboration to which these and similar fantasies may be subjected in art; in its primitive fashion it foreshadows the achievements of artistic form.

The ego is, in fact, the agent which enables psychic expression to emerge from the process of raw catharsis and to assume forms which are useful and pleasing. In 1922 (in the preliminary draft of The Ego and the Id) Freud noted that sublimation takes place when energy is desexualized. Four years later he stated that the ego works with desexualized energy. These two concepts are among the bases for modern research into creative thought processes. From them comes the view of the ego as "the psychic system that controls perception and motility, achieves solutions, and directs action." 1/ Adequate performance of these functions is possible only when a sufficient degree of freedom from instinctual involvements is attained. For technical reasons this is never actually complete, although it may be so great that the residual conflict is negligible; more frequently than is generally recognized, the conflict, though present, is pretty thoroughly under control. Hartmann therefore speaks of the "conflict-free ego sphere", by which is meant the range of ego activities conducted with relatively little interference from id sources or, to state it less negatively, those which transcend instinctual origins or whose base is in "higher" mental processes. As indicated earlier, this includes the whole range of synthetic ego functions such as problem solving, reality testing, and creative thinking together with their vast numbers of minutiae many of which go into the production of works of art and the transmission of the aesthetic experience.

Current psychoanalytic views of creativity gain much from the recognition that it may be regarded qualitatively as well as quantitatively and from the providing of a conceptual means of accounting for both kinds of attributes. This is best seen in the recent formulations of the nature of sublimation, one of the earliest psychoanalytic concepts now being re-examined in this connection. The technical hypotheses now being offered concern themselves with the character of psychic energy, the motive power of the psychic apparatus. So far has psychoanalytic theory come from the purely quantitative view that one investigator even suggests that "some qualitative change in energy may prove to be the only metapsychologically valid criterion of sublimation." 2/

1/ Heinz Hartmann & Ernst Kris, "The Genetic Approach in Psychoanalysis," Psa Study of the Child, I (1945), 11-30.

2/ Edward Glover, quoted in Heinz Hartmann, "Notes on the Theory of Sublimation," Psa Study of the Child, X (1955), 9-29.

In order to clarify the two aspects of the problem, it is probably better to adopt the proposal of Kris that "the term neutralization could be conveniently used to designate the relevant energy transformations, and that the term sublimation be reserved for the displacement of goal." /3 This has the merit of retaining the familiar usage of sublimation and referring to the newer concern with energetic changes by a distinctive term. Sublimation basic to the psychoanalytic study of art, may thus be seen as related to intention. This emancipates it from mechanistic conceptions while at the same time allowing for the necessary quantitative considerations. Both are relevant to the understanding of the link between sublimation and such familiar psychic processes as displacement and identification, but the focus is now upon the correlation between change of mode of energy from instinctual to non-instinctual and the change in the aims of the objects. This provides part of the theoretical basis for psychoanalytic study of artistic problems which it formerly lacked the means of handling conceptually.

Creativity, then, may be regarded as a special form of sublimation in which natural endowment facilitates the development of the ego towards mastery of its psychic environment and towards an increasing ability to devote itself to activities which are relatively independent of conflict. The part played by sexuality in this process has long been an object of study; currently, increased attention is being paid to the role of aggression. As basic forces in the psyche, they must both be involved significantly in creativity. According to the newer conceptions, there are actually three sources of psychic energy. Besides the sexual and aggressive instincts, there is, as I have mentioned, a stock of neutral energy helping to activate the ego.

Not only is this available for higher psychic functions, but exchanges and enhancements also are possible between it and the other two. This neutral energy "may stem from and may be re-transformed into either libido or aggression." /4 A tremendous reservoir of energy is therefore available for creative thought, some of it neutral and some of it tinged with sexual or aggressive characteristics. The artist, with his strong ego — i. e., one that can neutralize large quantities of energy from instinctual sources — is most fortunately equipped to bring maximum psychic resources to bear upon his artistic work. He also has a great deal to "invest" in the product, permitting it to attain a high degree of independence (secondary autonomy in ego functions), since he can tap the instinctual reservoir for replacements at need.

Ordinary ego activities are carried on by means of transitory shifts in the distribution of energy, the "energy flux." What makes creativity possible is the ability of the artist's ego to neutralize energy from the instincts and to commit it to the created thought or object. In this way the "secondary autonomy" of ego functions may be brought about. The corollary to this rather technical matter is that the artist, with his special capacity for neutralizing energy, is well fitted to master many situations in everyday reality as well. The primacy of sexual forces in this process has long been taken for granted, but recently a distinction of considerable importance has been proposed. Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein suggest that aggression plays a greater part in creativity than might be expected. In their view, it manifests itself in such fundamental activities of the psyche as the control of the body, the formation of psychic structures, and the mastery of outer reality. By the same token it takes part in the creation of artistic forms, and the possibility now exists for a theoretical integration of the phenomena of form and content which can now be seen to have an even more intimate psychic relationship than had been previously supposed.

3/ Ernst Kris, "Neutralization and Sublimation: Observations on Young Children," Ibid., 30-46.

4/ Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, and Rudolph M. Loewenstein, "Comments on the Formation of Psychic Structure," Psa Study of the Child, II (1947), 11-38.

Few of the motives for artistic creation which have so far been identified are well understood. Psychoanalysis has no comprehensive theory to account for them all. The inadequacy of the earlier cathartic theory has long been recognized, but as yet there is no agreement on its successor; even the restitution theory has its critics. Of the approaches to this problem which have been made by ego psychology I shall briefly describe the most promising.

One of the newest is Erikson's concept of ego identity, which has not yet received its full formulation. It attempts an accommodation of psychoanalysis and gestalt psychology that seems to hold considerable potential for the scientific understanding of complex mental acts. Erikson conceives of the process of psychic growth as moving through three major stages: the beginning awareness of separate selfhood in infancy and early childhood; the placing of that self in a dynamically satisfying relationship with some form of the family; and the evolution of this identification into a new configuration (Erikson's word) resulting from the recognition by society of the young individual as "somebody who had to become the way he is, and who, being the way he is, is taken for granted." <sup>5/</sup> It is a theory of growing autonomy, of development toward an ever more sharply delineated self-image. By the end of adolescence it is, for all practical purposes, complete.

The process is largely unconscious in both society and the individual, but accompanying it for the latter is what Erikson calls "a sense of psychosocial well-being"—usually just below the threshold of awareness but sometimes emerging into consciousness—a feeling that one is "at home in one's body", that one's course and destination are clear, and that the world, or at least those people in it who matter, will acknowledge one's gifts and achievements. This feeling is brought about by a series of extensions of horizons during genetic and social development, by a series of relationships with desired objects, and by a series of investments in the possibility of accomplishment which attain the status of convictions, almost of "givens."

Such an assumption of what amounts almost to destiny, coming to fruition at the time of life when the individual is ready to take on adult responsibilities, can be a powerful influence in the decision to become an artist. It is precisely at this time that the impulse to artistic creation is so strong in many people, a time when the realization of special abilities also often occurs. Erikson's theory, as applied to motives for creation, has comprehensiveness to recommend it. In the process of finding themselves, some people find that they are artists.

Psychic conflict is involved in the motivation of creative thought not only in the familiar sense that it supplies themes and energy but in other ways as well. Ego psychology now sees it as a necessary component in the development of the personality and not simply as a hazard which must be surmounted in order to avoid pathology. Thus the artist and his work are related even more intimately than before. By the agency of conflict the aims of both libido and aggression are modified and brought within the control of the ego so that it may be said psychoanalytically that the artist taps his own inner resources and shapes them to his own purposes rather than being driven helplessly by them into actions and thoughts not of his own choosing.

There are times, however, when creation may be motivated by a conflict situation in a fairly direct fashion. Like some psychoanalytic patients who talk a great deal about autobiographical details in order to avoid talking about the immediate psychic problem, an artist might contrive a work of fiction in order to mask a conflict. Ernst Kris gives a striking example of the feel-

<sup>5/</sup> Erik Homburger Erikson, "The Problem of Ego Identity," Journal of the Amer Psu Assn, IV, 1 (January 1956), 68.

ing of protection which such an invention may give both creator and audience. A captain of Marines on a Pacific Island in World War II came upon one of his men on duty alone in a solitary outpost listening to a short-wave radio tuned to an American station. "The captain reported that he hardly had time to ask himself whether or not such listening, while on outpost, was permissible; he found himself within a short time engrossed in the story. It dealt with outposts of Marine detachments waiting on a Pacific island for a Japanese attack .... Safety in the aesthetic illusion protects from the danger in reality, even if both dangers should be identical." <sup>6</sup> This is so even when the danger is psychic rather than external. In this connection ego-psychology says nothing about the production of a particular form; it is concerned here only with motivation.

Another widely held theory of motivation involving conflict stresses restitution rather than protection. The artist creates because he has unconsciously fantasized the destruction of certain objects. To overcome this psychically felt loss, he restores them by putting them into a work of art. Or he has (again unconsciously) entertained a forbidden wish, and his artistic fantasy enables him to atone for it. The relation of this theory to the basic conflict of Eros and Thanatos will readily be seen. Creation is the artist's way of frustrating the triumph of the death tendency: he brings into existence an object which cannot die. (This theory is, of course, not exclusive with psychoanalysts. See, for example, Keats' "Ode on a Grecian Urn.")

The restitution theory has been objected to by Bychowski on the ground that it is not inclusive and must be counted "only as one of the possible unconscious mechanisms of creation." <sup>7</sup> As an example of another he cites the case in which the artist has abandoned the world because of unconscious conflicts and then felt the need to become part of it once more. Creation can thus become, as Freud said earlier, a way back to reality.

Further support for the theory that creation is motivated by the simultaneous wish to destroy and to make restitution for the wish lies in the earliest stages of ego development. The child, when it becomes aware of itself as an entity different from its surroundings, is able to transfer emotional values to other human objects. This, however, is not a simple transfer. The child's parents or their surrogates have caused it to experience both gratification and deprivation, and the feelings, therefore, are a mixture of positive and negative, or what psychoanalysis terms ambivalent. Moreover, this quality persists throughout life, though it varies in strength. In this way any later impulse to create may well take on the character of an act to undo a destructive fantasy. This act consists not only of the alternation of feelings just mentioned but also of simultaneous experiencing of both kinds at once. The creation is accomplished by reconstituting the object according to the artist's aesthetic conception, and this means that the image of the object in its natural context must be destroyed. Thus gratification at partial satisfaction of the destructive impulse is achieved, guilt at the destructive wish is alleviated, and pleasure at the new creation is felt, all being experienced concomitantly, and the combined, complicated value of the whole is invested in the created object. To this is added the pleasure which the ego feels in solving artistic problems and in the operation of the psychic apparatus itself. A statue, a novel, or a concerto each constitutes a world with its elements better ordered than they might have been in non-artistic external reality.

<sup>6/</sup> Ernst Kris, Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, New York, International Universities Press, 1952, p. 45.

<sup>7/</sup> Gustav Bychowski, "From Catharsis to Work of Art: The Making of an Artist," in Psychoanalysis & Culture: Essays in Honor of Géza Róheim, New York, International Universities Press, 1951, p. 396.

But another motive exists, counter to these and stemming from the urge to master the actual environment by learning about it. From childhood on, curiosity serves this purpose. One looks, hears, investigates, tries out new things, and does over and over those which have special appeal. When this is done not merely for pleasure but for the sake of mastery it is said to be motivated by the repetition-compulsion, the habit of repeating an act until its accompanying affect has been assimilated into the psychic equilibrium. It obviously influences the choice of the conflict which is to be represented symbolically through theme, plot, and characterization, and it is related to the phenomenon of recurrence in the work of some authors. Then a first novel is followed by a series of others in which variations are played on the same theme, it may be guessed that the author is still striving to master the situation from which the series took its genesis. Conversely, fresh, independent books argue for successful early handling of the material, leaving the author free to go on to other things.

The clues may be more subtle than those afforded by theme, plot, and characterization. Studies of imagery, for instance, may reveal striking patterns showing the author's attitude towards certain aspects of his work. Repetition or its absence, and the relating of otherwise disparate elements through similarity of image clusters may provide useful hints toward the understanding of the psychic motives of a work and its appeal to certain types of audiences.

What underlies all these motives for creation is the fundamental drive of the ego toward mastery of its environment. Creativity must be seen as a special instance of this necessity. At the very least, the organism must survive; this is the ego's first responsibility. Beyond mere survival, however, there is the need for effective functioning, and here the ego's capacity for selecting, analyzing, organizing, and controlling elements from both the psyche and the exterior world provides not only solutions to problems but also rearrangements of situations which serve to maintain the dynamic equilibrium. Aesthetic activity grows out of the regular functioning of the psychic life processes.

For the artist the most important mastery is mastery of his material, and here the ego plays its part. It regulates the blind power thrusts of the id, helps determine which unconscious trains of associations shall receive the essential energetic strength, and contrives consciously the patterns within which they shall be displayed and to which they give life. In these ways, among others, it arranges the transmission of experience from artist to audience. Artistic conventions, currents of taste, the demands of the medium and the genre—all these are incorporated by it into the grand design which serves the creator's purpose. For the most effective work, not only innate talent is required but ego strength as well.

Creation may be characterized psychoanalytically as a process having two phases, inspiration and elaboration. In the first, impulses from the id attain a high degree of expression, but this occurs only under the close control of the ego which receives their powerful manifestations, shuts off the supply when it chooses, and turns them to its own uses. The primary process is thus channeled into organized patterns of expression at the direction of the reality-controlling, problem-solving agency, and this is no less true because the id impulses may be perceived by it as coming from the outside. That is, the individual is aware of an idea or flash of insight which appears to have originated elsewhere and of which he is only the gifted receiver, his gift consisting precisely in the ability to receive such "messages." The impulse has, of course, not actually been external to his psyche but only to his ego.

A certain amount of preconscious manipulation of it then takes place during this inspirational phase, but the product is far from a finished work of art, for the modifications, as described in The Interpretation of Dreams, are just enough to soften the forbidden elements and make the whole admissible to consciousness. There have been various attempts to bring to light such creation as takes place during this phase (e. g., automatic drawing, surrealism) and to place a high artistic value on the product on the ground that it came directly from the "true" artistic center of the psyche. This romantic misreading of psychoanalysis is, of course, directly opposed to its real concern which is with the value of the higher thought processes, and it is easy to see why Freud was at some pains to repudiate those enthusiasts who claimed that his discoveries had established the id as the seat of the artistic personality and the sole source of art.

Instead of emphasizing the crude origins, Freud insisted rather that the essence of artistic creation was the reworking of the elements into consistent artistic wholes, and in this it is necessary to go beyond even the second phase, that of unconscious elaboration. To be sure, in producing a work of art, the artist builds upon the partial alteration of the fantasy which has occurred unconsciously, but at least as significant a part of the work in conscious. The impulses, having achieved partial expression, are no longer in a position to exercise control, and the work of art may acquire greater independence from their demands; i. e., secondary autonomy. Another way of saying this is that the unconscious psychic mechanisms are satisfied and that the conscious perceptions and acts of the artist can now deal with the material according to aesthetic rather than psychic considerations. Though this statement is an oversimplification, perhaps it may help to clarify the actual process.

From an energetic standpoint the emergence of an idea which may become part of an artistic work occurs in this fashion. A part of the energy which was formerly employed in repressing a given forbidden impulse is shifted to another, perhaps a more threatening one. This increases the possibility that the first impulse might drive past the barrier of counter-force. If the energetic shift is of sufficient magnitude, then the "upward" movement may be accompanied by feelings of relief, elation, and similar sensations which then become a part of the pleasure of creating. But the mere removal of a fraction of the opposing force is not enough; the drive so far is only preconscious (that is, free of repression or counter-cathexis) but not yet conscious. It must compete with a great many others for the limited amount of attention which is available at any one time. Extra energy is necessary to assure the center of the stage (the technical term for the acquisition of this extra energy is hyper-cathexis). It comes from quantities of energy which have been engaged in repressing other drives of lesser significance but which are now attracted to the emerging one by its accompanying elation or relief and which thereupon enter its service, thus increasing the pleasurable feeling.

It is presumed that such increase is felt to be greater than the risk of the actual liberation elsewhere in the psyche of other material accompanied by negative; i. e., unpleasurable, feelings, or else the emergence of the impulse in question could not take place. Conversely, if the danger of the negative feelings should be greater, then presumably the rise of the pleasurable ones would be restrained and the process of creation thereby inhibited.

This dynamic equilibrium of feelings, actuated by shifts in cathexis, abides by the rules of the primary process in what Rapaport calls the "inventive" phase of creative thinking. In many essentials this is identical with what I have been calling here, after Kris, "inspiration." That is, it is characterized by primitive thinking and largely controlled by feeling which depends in turn on relative quantities of psychic energy. As yet this does not involve cerebration in any significant way. As the idea rises

into consciousness, it may consist of "a vague general 'feel,' a sense of relationship, a schematic pattern, a verbal or visual fragment, and so on." <sup>8/</sup> In the beginning it has few or no relationships with other conscious thoughts. The elaborative phase of creation follows, and it is then that such relationships may be established. Connections are made, patterns are created, and communication is possible. From an internal, idiosyncratic process, operating almost automatically, a product emerges which is modified or even transformed into something which can be received and understood by another person. Having passed through the primary and secondary processes, the material is now subjected to a much higher degree of conscious control according to an entirely different set of rules, the requirements of society, of communication, of art.

## v

In view of the belief held by some that authors are primarily concerned with externalization of their inner conflicts and that their books may therefore be read simply as embodiments of such conflicts, it is necessary to understand the interest which ego psychology takes in this aspect of the creative process. It is true that some books come close to answering this description, but it may safely be said that most do not. A distinction must be made here between origin and result; the genetic fallacy must be avoided. Although a book may be written under the influence of psychic conflict, this does not necessarily determine its form, its message, or its impact. This is so simply because conflict is not the only force at work in creation. In fact, if it assumes too prominent a role in motivation, it may well vitiate the result, damaging or even destroying the book as a work of art. Psychoanalytic ego psychology stresses control by the artist. Emergence from conflict plays a part in every creative process.

The functioning of the ego is significantly influenced by the fact that it originates, in part, outside the sphere of instinctual conflict altogether. In so far as the creative process utilizes this primordial uncommitted energy, the work of art is also independent of conflict and its vicissitudes. This may be true as well of those contents of the ego which originated in conflict, as a defense against an instinctual drive, for example, and which develop thereafter into ideas having no further connection with their origins. In ego-psychological terms these "aims, attitudes, interests, structures of the ego" <sup>9/</sup> have entered its conflict-free sphere. Together with the ones which were free of conflictual influences from the beginning, these constitute the greater part of those mental acts which take place during the elaborative phase of creative thought. They are therefore of supreme importance for our understanding of that aspect of artistic activity from a psychoanalytic standpoint.

They are largely under the control of the artist, but this is because they have already passed through the secondary process just as ordinary ideas libidinally or aggressively influenced have passed through the primary process. In secondary-process thought, memory governs. We are speaking here of unconscious memory with a conceptual organization based not simply on sensory memory-traces but on the activation of these by quantities of energy, that is, by cathexes. In contrast with the primary process, in which cathexes are quite mobile, shifting readily from one train of associations to another, the secondary-process cathexes are relatively stable. They are bound; i. e., more or less permanently committed to a given idea or cluster of ideas. It is rather difficult to shift them, and the ideas they give power to are not striving — as primary-process ideas are — for immediate and total discharge. Consequently, this portion of the ego af-

<sup>8/</sup> David Rapaport, "Toward a Theory of Thinking," Organization and Pathology of Thought, New York, Columbia University Press p. 720.

<sup>9/</sup> Ibid., p. 366.

fords the safest channels for the release of tensions. Such release can take place at a rate and in a direction both of which are subject to a large degree of unconscious ego-control, depending upon the quantity and intensity of pleasure attained by the ego in the process. As Rapaport remarks, secondary-process thought, although it sustains the goal of the pleasure-principle, reaches it "not on the path of least resistance but on that of greatest advantage." <sup>10</sup> Surely this effectively destroys the notion that psychoanalysis regards the artist as the prisoner of his emotions and the victim of his conflicts and that it reduces his art to "nothing but" the automatic, helpless response to them.

The increasing sophistication of psychoanalytic thought raises its potential as an instrument for the scientific study of creativity. Its actual value for this purpose is difficult to assess at present because psychoanalytic ego psychology may be said to be in its formative stage. Much more information needs to be gathered, and the various contending hypotheses must undergo the test of time. In view of this, it is well for us to be patient. All that it has given us so far are some insights and an expectation. Perhaps the insights will be added to and deepened; perhaps the expectation will be fulfilled; perhaps not. The only relevant question for us is whether we can make use of what is now available.

The answer is that we can, but it must be on a tentative basis. The concern of science with the mind as an entity functioning in ways appropriate to the contexts in which it finds itself, or which it invents, parallels the speculative thinker's view of literary thought. The ever closer approximation of these two modes of conceptualization affords promise of greater usefulness as their translatability is enhanced. What is crucial is that more attention is being given to psychoanalytic studies of mental phenomena on higher and higher levels beyond the instinctual. The intellectual and the imaginative are being studied on their own terms, and psychoanalysis is gaining the power to deal with problems of configuration and milieu, and consequently, of art.

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10/ David Rapaport, *op. cit.*, p. 702.

## BOOK REVIEWS

The Death of Love in Letters\*

Often a good idea is transformed, within a month, into a commonplace of thought. Leslie Fiedler's Love and Death in the American Novel is composed of good ideas which have already furnished matter for a dozen books, none commonplace. Describing as gothic or sentimental the leading styles of American fiction, he argues that our writing is duplicitous because writers are not permitted to say what they see but are forced to see only what American culture tells them they're supposed to say. Fiedler isn't intimidated by the fact that others, notably Van Wyck Brooks in the studies of Mark Twain and Henry James, have long maintained that the American style of life degrades the art of its best men. Although he admits that this idea appears in Lawrence's Studies in Classic American Literature, he invokes Lawrence only in order to confirm his "own suspicions that it is duplicity and outrageousness which determine the quality" of our most important books.

Unlike any predecessor, however, Fiedler applies these thoughts to the specific matter of love in American writing. Treating this subject, he says, our writers offer two kinds of ersatz. Taught to fear their passions, they substitute a corrupt adaptation of the Richardsonian novel and present a sentimental religion of love. Or, shifting their mood, they fiddle with the claptrap of gothicism and replace goddesses with bitches. "It is maturity above all things that the American writer fears, and marriage seems to him its essential sign." In place of straightforward sexual union, therefore, our classic literature requires homoerotic union. This unique image of human love was introduced into American writing by Cooper ("sexless... a kind of counter-matrimony"), but it acquired splendor in Melville's imagination (as a "Holy Marriage of Males"), and achieved transcendence in Mark Twain's mind where, after having shared the "brief, harried honeymoon" of Huck and Jim, we are allowed to laugh at our own duplicity. For if we "were once to stop laughing, we would be betrayed out of the Neverland of childhood back into the actual world of maturity." Our history is dignified by certain superb fictions that explore this theme. Yet American writing, to its discredit, is not by love possessed but is by evasion obsessed and therefore turns "from society to nature or nightmare out of a desperate need to avoid the facts of wooing, marriage, and child-bearing." "Where is our Madame Bovary, our Anna Karenina, our Pride and Prejudice or Vanity Fair?"

Love and Death is, I've hoped to intimate, a book loaded with the kind of lore Fiedler's fine and happy mind is expert at portraying. ("When the Beatniks emerge from their own retreats, bearded and blue-shaded and bagel in hand, to mock the 'squares' of San Francisco with the monstrous disorder of life as they imagine and live it, they are playing the latest version of the game invented by 'Monk' Lewis.") Other reviewers have admired his wit but complained about his disregard of earlier work, his sacrifice of fact; have fussed over the problem of finding for this work a suitable definition. The harshest of these, Irving Howe, has remarked that Fiedler lacks one gift which is "fundamental to the critic: the willingness to subordinate his own schemes... to the actualities of a particular novel or poem, the love or generosity which persuades a critic to see the work in its own terms and not to bend it to his own personal or ideological needs." Everyone says that Fiedler lacks tact because he distorts text. I must add my voice. For Love and Death, which begins as an effort to unite Freud and Jung in a fusion calculated to render the quintessence of motive in American history and art, ends in confusion whereby

\* Leslie A. Fiedler — Love and Death in the American Novel. New York: Criterion Books, 1960. Pp. 605 + 14 (with Index). \$8.50.

art, history, Freud and Jung disappear and only Fiedler remains. And Fiedler's good but not that good.

One example will serve. "To Henry James the Fair Maiden... is quite simply America herself;" her "whiteness" is "the outward manifestation of our mysterious national immunity to guilt, which he feels is at once lovely, comic and quite terrible." True enough, we agree, if applied to The Wings of the Dove. But Fiedler prefers to apply his thought to The Golden Bowl. And, he continues,

Only Prince Amerigo understands this mystery in all its implications... Amerigo has learned about the pure American woman, who is, in the European sense, not a woman at all... by reading one of those typical American books without women, Edgar Poe's The Narrative of A. Gordon Pym. And he knows, therefore, that in moving into the polar world of American morality, he is leaving behind the moral 'blackness of darkness' to which as an Italian he has grown up, to confront a 'dazzling curtain of light, yet of the color of milk or snow....'

Thus Amerigo moves toward Maggie Verver, whom Fiedler calls an "embodiment of a country which dreams such virgins of milk and snow," "more Christ than woman, more angel of death than Christ."

The Golden Bowl does not say what Fiedler thinks it says. Amerigo, recalling Pym, is not reflecting on Maggie but on Mrs. Assingham who had arranged his marriage and whose motives he does not understand. His European idea of recompense is to make love to the woman who takes him up. And he realizes that this isn't appropriate payment to Mrs. Assingham — not because she's a frigid American goddess but because she expects no payment at all. She is a disinterested woman. Reflecting on his own confusion seeing the actions of people who don't behave in the European way, Amerigo — as context shows — recalls Pym. And, he thinks, "there were moments when he felt his own boat move upon some such mystery" like that which Pym faces in the last moment as he moves toward that curtain. It is the whiteness of their virtue — pure virtue far more than sheer innocence — that dazzles Amerigo, a virtue that causes them to invest him with special "attributes." He was taken seriously. Lost there in the white mist was "the seriousness in them" — the italics are James' — that made them so take him. Their idea of his value, James concludes, is "the shrouded object" to which Fiedler refers. And the novel then proceeds to unfold nearly two full volumes of penetration which enables the Prince to understand these strange people, which enables Maggie to tear the shroud that hides from her some black facts of life. That is, the movement of the Prince is from blackness toward whiteness, of Maggie from whiteness toward blackness. Grey is the color of life in our world, The Golden Bowl says, and only when Maggie requires an accurate measure of her father's quality and her husband's worth, when she's less of a nun and more of a nymph, can real marriage begin — are Maggie and Amerigo ready for bed. As the movement is both moral and sexual, so penetration is both metaphoric and phallic. And since marriage does in fact begin as the novel ends, Maggie can scarcely be described as an impenetrable virgin or Christ or angel of death.

Close reasoning is duller than expansive unreason and Fiedler is never dull, only unreasonable. Although some reviewers have tried to find a niche for this book, none I think has understood what Love and Death represents. Richard Chase thinks it returns to the outmoded methods of Main Currents in American Thought but I'm certain he misses the point. Love and Death is — as James said of Daisy Miller — pure poetry. Fiedler hasn't tried to write that great work of literary history which is evoked by mention of Parington's effort. On the contrary, his book combines two devices of thought which we can call psychoanalytic and historic. Exercising these he replaces history with fantasy, with a version of life and letters that plays tricks on the dead.

We are forced to decide, therefore, that his big question—  
 Where is our Madame Bovary...?"—is not serious. One answer  
 is Willa Cather's A Lost Lady, a novel he does not mention. But  
 Fiedler doesn't want an answer. Indeed, no book can answer this  
 inquiry— even Madame Bovary doesn't fill the bill. What Fiedler  
 thinks he sees in European letters does not flourish there, is not  
 central to the novels he admires, does not yet exist in literature  
 or in life. Surely he knows that when literature shows us a world  
 peopled by full-fledged mature men and women for whom love is the  
 exemplary stuff of both bedchamber and General Assembly, then at  
 last we're close to utopia. And because Fiedler doesn't offer  
 evidence, use system or tact, we conclude that his inquiry is above  
 all a gambit which expresses the peculiar mark of his extraordinary  
 mind: insatiability. And we suspect that he, writing a history  
 of French or Russian or English letters, would end saying, But  
 where is their Huckleberry Finn?

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Maurice Beebe, general editor—Wadsworth Guides to Literary Study. San Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1960-61. Paperback, \$1.95 each (\$1.00, plus shipping charges, to faculty members).

Eleven titles have appeared thus far, all most attractively printed and presented in paperbacks running less than 200 pages each. For the record we list editors and titles:

Maurice Beebe (Purdue) — Literary Symbolism: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Literature.

Helmut Bonheim (California at Santa Barbara) — The "King Lear" Perplex.

Royal A. Gettman (Illinois) — "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner": A Handbook (contains the complete texts of the 1798 and 1854 versions on facing pages).

Seymour L. Gross (Notre Dame) — A "Scarlet Letter" Handbook.

Bruce Harkness (Illinois) — Conrad's "The Heart of Darkness" and the Critics and Conrad's "Secret Sharer" and the Critics (each contains the full text of the Conrad work discussed).

Bernard R. Kogan (Illinois at Chicago) — Darwin and His Critics: The Darwinian Revolution.

Lauriat Lane, Jr. (New Brunswick) — Approaches to "Walden".

William T. Stafford (Purdue) — Melville's "Billy Budd" and the Critics (contains the complete text).

Edward Wasiolek (Chicago) — "Crime and Punishment" and the Critics.

Kingsley Widmer (San Diego) and Eleanor Widmer — Literary Censorship: Principles, Cases, Problems.

Your Editor would rather not take sides in the growing controversy over the scholarly and educational validity of the so-called "controlled research" paperbacks. With the growing body of undergraduates, usually too badly trained to make efficient use of what are in most cases inadequate library facilities for "mass" research, it seems probable that texts of this kind are here to stay. Our only concern is that they should be truly representative collections, useful for the undergraduate student of literature and com-

position, helpful to the instructor, and free from pedantry, special pleading, and excessive bias. The present series meets these requirements rather better than any of the others which your Editor has seen (and in some cases used).

We should inquire here into the way in which these texts deal with our special problem: the presentation of literary criticism which is informed by depth psychology to the undergraduate student of English or comparative literature. Neither the present series nor, to your Editor's knowledge, any other series provides a specialized casebook in such criticism. Yet if The Darwinian Revolution can provide a point of concentration for a text in a series which is by definition devoted to "literary study," it is hard to see why The Freudian Revolution could not be equally if not more valid as a point of departure for the same purpose. There is no point, however, in reviewing a text which does not exist; let us therefore consider very cursorily how much relevant material the now-existing texts in this series do provide.

The most promising title is, of course, Professor Beebe's Literary Symbolism, for, as Leon Edel has often pointed out, symbolism is the common ground of the literary critic and the psychoanalyst. But Mr. Beebe, in what is admittedly a laudable desire to avoid the "here-a-phallic-symbol-there-a-phallic-symbol" school, has gone to the other extreme and thrown out the baby with the bath-water. The nearest approach to a psychodynamic orientation in the first half of the book, on "The Nature of Symbolism," is—amazingly enough—Mary McCarthy's account of the interpretations and misinterpretations of her "true" narrative "Artists in Uniform" ("Settling the Colonel's Hash," from the February 1954 issue of Harper's Magazine). Even the selection from Edmund Wilson's Axel's Castle is devoted to "Symbolism" rather than symbolism. The second section ("Problems in Symbolism") offers little more, although it does contain two excerpts from Erich Fromm, both relating to symbolic interpretations of The Book of Jonah. Mr. Beebe's limited viewpoint is perhaps best expressed in Miss Church's explication of "A Country Doctor," in which she warns that "the symbolism should not be interpreted in too narrow a Freudian sense," that the "heads of the horses thrust through the window or the worms in the wound may be phallic in significance, but the action of Kafka's work takes place in a more general area." The year 1958 is rather a late date for repetition of the fallacious equation: Freudian = phallic. In listing the "Basic Types of Criticism" in Appendix I, Mr. Beebe evinces a nostalgia for "evaluation" and completely excludes "explication in depth" from his definition of "explication."

Professor Bonheim's text, with its allusive title, carrying overtones of the "King Lear Complex" of Arpad Pauncz, is ingeniously organized. It includes only selected criticism of Lear, in chronological order, from Tate's implied criticism in his 1687 rewriting of the play to Elton's 1960 analysis of ambivalence and madness versus paganism and "faith," omitting all suggestions for the writing of student themes, but providing an elaborate bibliography and an excellent index. Although Lear has never produced as much writing from the psychoanalysts as has Othello, for instance (not to mention Hamlet, of course), Mr. Bonheim has chosen his material artfully, from all periods, and representing all shades of critical opinion, including much that we would very properly call "psychological." We have, for example, the tortured writhings of Lamb, Hazlitt, and Swinburne in the face of the implications of the Lear theme; early attempts to cope with the problem of the precise nature of Lear's madness (1847, 1866); criticism like Tolstoy's that tells us more about the critic than it does about the play; and recent interpretations with varying components of psychodynamic emphasis, like Empson's, John Donnelly's (from Psa. Rev., XL [1953], 149-155, not previously noted by us); G. Wilson Knight's, William Frost's (ritual), and, of course, Freud's and Pauncz's. Freud's equation of the "daughters" and the Parcae is, unfortunately, imbedded in his "Three Caskets" essay; Lear should have had the complete treatment that Freud intended to

give it as late as 1934 (see Norman N. Holland's "Freud on Shakespeare," MIT Publications in the Humanities 47, pp. 16-19). The Pauncz essay, which Professor Bonheim has presented with its best foot forward, has always stuck in your Editor's throat. It seems to be motivated in large part by the author's desire to go down in psychoanalytic history with the originators of the Oedipus Complex and the Orestes Complex (Wertham). The entries in the Bibliography which deal with Madness, Old Age, and certain of the other special topics will give the student ample opportunity for further investigation into areas illuminated by depth psychology.

Professor Gettman's text on "The Ancient Mariner" suggests in its preface that its aim will be that of "symposium criticism," in which critical viewpoints are cumulative rather than controversial.

The reader who feels that he is not grasping the whole of 'The Ancient Mariner' may be comforted by the fact that... much criticism is fractional and incomplete. (Maud Bodkin's frank avowal of the limited nature of her method is a case in point, and her practice might well be followed by other critics.) More often than not, a critic does not refute or contradict the work of his predecessors: rather, he qualifies or extends it. (p. vii).

Our special interest is not neglected. Of the excerpts included in the section on Symbolism, we would carry the following signs in our running bibliographies: %-George Herbert Clarke, %-Maud Bodkin ("The Rebirth Archetype" from Archetypal Patterns), &-G. Wilson Knight, %-Robert Penn Warren, X-Elmer Edgar Stoll, and %-W. H. Auden. Despite his protests we should have to use "%" for John Livingston Lowes. In one of the Suggestions for Study Mr. Gettman refers to Jacques Schnier's "The Symbol of the Ship in Art, Myth and Dreams," Psa. Rev. (1951).

If there is little of our viewpoint in the Scarlet Letter handbook, we need not blame Professor Gross. Your Editor, in his research on Hawthorne (which has lasted more years than he cares to remember) has found very little valid psychodynamically-oriented critical writing. Excerpts from William Bysshe Stein's investigation of the Faust-theme add some depth to the explication; there is some usable, if rather haphazard, psychological penetration in the excerpts from F. I. Carpenter, Marius Bewley, and F. O. Matthiessen (the last-named suffers from inadequacy in the sample printed), but the main difficulty, as your Editor has discovered, is that no study of The Scarlet Letter is complete if it does not take in the entire body of Hawthorne's fiction and a good part of his biography as well. The psychoanalytic studies by Lois Adkins and Joseph Levi are referred to in the Bibliography. Also in the same listing there is a reference to a full-length study by Rudolphe Von Abele (represented in the text by a shorter piece from Accent): The Death of the Artist: A Study of Hawthorne's Disintegration (The Hague, 1955), not previously noted by us.

The inclusion of the full text of Heart of Darkness (the other Conrad volume is not before your Editor at this time), taking up 70 of the 176 pages which make up this volume, reduces the amount of critical material drastically. There is little or nothing for our special interest, although the Conrad works seem to cry aloud for psychological treatment. Hollingsworth's essay from Lit & Psych V, 78-83, is referred to in the Bibliography; Dr. Ford's essay on Lord Jim is not. The Billy Budd volume also contains the complete text. "The third section," writes Mr. Stafford in his Preface, "is composed of five different readings—a biographical reading, a social reading, a mythic-psychanalytical reading [Professor Richard Chase's], and two esthetic readings—each embodying and operating from a different critical premise and yet each also representing in one sense a total interpretation of the tale. The Bibliography contains a reference to two pages in Fiction and the Unconscious with the simple notation that this represents "a psychological reading." We have not seen the Wasiolek book on Crime

and Punishment; it is said to contain sections on "Psychology and Symbol" as well as on "Marxist Views."

We conclude with some comments on the Widmer book on Literary Censorship, although the only thing that is before us at the time of this writing is its Table of Contents. Names which evoke some response are those of Dr. Wertham and Professor Fiedler, both represented in the section on Censorship of Comic Books. There seems to be a large number of excerpts from legal decisions, including one by Judge Jerome Frank in the same section, and Judge Bryan's decision on Lady Chatterley's Lover. Your Editor regrets the omission of Judge Woolsey's Ulysses decision, not only because it is good criticism as well as good law, but also because it shows a marked change in the climate of judicial interpretation in the twenty-five years which elapsed between the two cases. Judge Bryan relied strongly on the opinions of literary critics to aid him in determining whether the Lawrence book was obscene; Judge Woolsey read Ulysses himself, putting himself in the place of "l'homme moyen sensuel."

L. F. M.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY (XL)

##### Other (relevant) books received:

% - M. H. Abrams, ed. — English Romantic Poets: Modern Essays in Criticism (New York: Oxford Press Galaxy Paperback GB 35, 1960). Pp. viii + 384 (no index). \$2.65.

& - Walter Jackson Bate — From Classic to Romantic: Premises of Taste in Eighteenth Century England (New York: Harper Torchbooks Paperback TB 1036, [1946] 1961). Pp. viii + 197 (with index of names). \$1.35.

& - Edward S. Le Comte — A Milton Dictionary (New York: Phil. Libr., 1961). Pp. ? + 358. \$6.00. [The print is even worse than L&P, VI, 4.]

\* - Ralph J. Hallman — Psychology of Literature: A Study of Alienation and Tragedy (New York: Phil. Libr., 1961). Pp. 262 (with notes and index). \$4.75. [The author, chairman of the Social Science Department at the Pasadena City College, has given — or permitted to be given — to his book an unnecessarily pretentious title. His purpose is revealed — at least partly, in his Preface: "This book does not analyze in detail the more traditionally aesthetic aspects of tragedy, either tragedy as literature or tragedy as life. Rather it seeks to identify the psychological and anthropological forces which converge to make the tragic mode possible." He proposes a sequel, which "will need to limit itself to aesthetic principles." The dichotomy seems indefensible.]

% - Alfred Harbage — As They Liked It: A Study of Shakespeare's Moral Artistry (New York: Harper Torchbooks Paperback TB 1035, [1947] 1961). Pp. xv + 234 (with notes, list of works cited, and index). \$1.50.

& - Thorne Shipley [Univ of Miami School of Medicine], ed. — Classics in Psychology (New York: Phil. Libr., 1961). Pp. xx + 1342 (with biographical notes and further suggested readings following each contribution, and index of names). \$20.00 (and the binding on our review copy is already breaking). [The analytic, annotated Table of Contents lists excerpts (often rather inadequate excerpts) from the writings of Herbart, Wundt, Holmholtz, Mach, William James, Titchener, William Stern, Pinel, Esquirol, Charcot, Bleuler, Kraepelin, Benjamin Rush, Morton Prince, W. von Jauregg, Sakel, Hughlings Jackson, Sherrington, Breuer and Freud (Freud's only contribution to the text, although he is often mentioned passim), Adler, Jung, Pavlov, Watson, Hull, Cattell, Binet and Simon, Rorschach, Aichhorn, Stanley Hall, Jean Piaget, Wernheimer, Köhler, Koffka, Isaac Ray, Kurt Lewin, and McDougall.]

% - C. P. Snow — Time of Hope (New York: Harper Torchbooks Paperback TB 1040, [1949] 1961). Pp. 416. \$1.95.